Ludwig Wittgenstein contributed two major pieces of work to philosophy. The first, the Tractatus, was a celebrated attempt to systematically explain language as a form of representation which, to be meaningful, has to represent the world in terms that can be confirmed by experience. In this way, he hoped to finally solve all philosophical problems by eliminating them as meaningless. Metaphysics, for instance, which does not make statements verifiable by experience, is therefore meaningless and so no longer a problem. Having written it, Wittgenstein gave up philosophy altogether for some time.

The second work, Philosophical Investigations, was written later, after doubts led him to return to Cambridge and take up philosophy again. Following 10 years of working through his ideas with students and fellows in lectures, he was elected to the chair of philosophy. The Investigations being the condensate of these discussions, sets about refuting his previous work and similar approaches, replacing them with a non-systematic, non-representational view of language. Nevertheless his aim of eliminating many philosophical conundrums remained, although in contrast to his previous work, many are now only transformed into new, more practical, forms.

In the introduction to the Investigations Wittgenstein writes:

I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own.

Philosophical Investigations, Preface p viii

In this he was certainly successful. The work was unfinished, published after his death by his students. Possibly, by nature, it could never have been finished. It is a unique book in philosophy: if there are arguments, they are only implied. It is, instead, merely a series of "remarks" (Preface vii) intended to lead the reader through the landscape of our language, noting various features and comparing them with philosophical attempts to systematically describe them, including his own Tractatus,. It is perhaps his aim to show how the reality of language escapes them all. It is also perhaps his aim to indicate that language will likely escape any complete, systematic, analysis.

Given such a non-systematic body of thought, how can I bring out the most interesting parts of Wittgenstein’s thinking, without having to get into every detail of both books? I am going to try and take you on a short walk through the landscape Wittgenstein describes which leads to the following remark in the Investigations.

If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.

Philosophical Investigations, Part 2 xi

This walk will be a bit of a straighter path through the landscape than Wittgenstein’s but, if you find it intriguing, I highly recommend letting Wittgenstein take you on the full tour. I have added some references to the text where Wittgenstein explores these ideas more deeply, although many are spread throughout the book.

The Short Walk

To start with it’s probably a good idea to be clear what a talking lion means here. In the passages around this quotation, Wittgenstein discusses what it is like when we visit foreign countries where we do not speak the language and how it is difficult to understand the behaviour of the people. I think it’s clear that Wittgenstein means a lion that is talking his own language rather than any human language. We are trying to learn that language. Hence Wittgenstein’s claim is that we could not learn a lion-language.

This is a far more interesting statement than if we were to think of a lion speaking a human language badly. That would just mean a lion can’t learn a human language which is a lot less surprising than the idea that we superior humans with our complex and subtle linguistic abilities would not be able to understand the talk of a mere lion, given adequate study.

The Limits of Reference

Let’s examine how we might learn the lion language. First of all we can assume that the lion is talking about the same world as us. He might see different things in that world but presumably there is a large amount of things that we both experience. Perhaps also, with scientific instruments we might bridge that gap. So perhaps we can listen to a word in the language, (presumably some kind of growl) and see when he says it. Perhaps when the lion looks at a wildebeest, the lion makes a certain growl. That could mean "wildebeest" or "food". In this way, with lots of observations and through a process of elimination, we can learn the language.

Philosophical Investigations, Part 1, 1-20

Or can we? Could this growl not mean "Lo! The call of the hunt surges in my veins and I yearn to bare my claws in glorious victory!"? Maybe it is a call used like "Banzai!" was used, or "Geronimo!". Would such a call "refer" to anything except perhaps the feeling that lions have when they see their prey? We could note that the growl occurs when wildebeest are there and miss the real meaning, possibly not noticing subtle differences in intonation between different cases.

Philosophical Investigations, Part 1, 23-27

Think of someone saying "How I wish she would come" while gazing out of the window or the same words while looking at a watch and tapping their foot. In these cases it seems that the meaning is different. Is it just a matter of us not understanding how a lion feels when he sees a wildebeest in the way that we know what it feels like to be waiting for someone (in differing circumstances)? Is this why we might not learn the lion-language?

The private language argument

Lions might not be the same as humans but at least they are mammals and watching wildlife programs allows us to feel that they share some of our feelings and sensations. Anger, affection towards offspring and pain. But can we say that we can learn the lion language because the lion has the same feelings and sensations as us? A lion has a thorn in his paw and makes a plaintive growl. Do we understand the lion because we have the same feeling or sensation?

If I have a sensation, how well do I remember that sensation the next day? Let’s say I remember feeling pain. Today, again I have a sensation. Is it now also "pain"? Or is it just discomfort? One thing can certainly be a form of the other. How accurately do I need to remember the previous pain? Does the pain today make me feel nauseous? Can I sleep? It is said that the difference between flu and a cold is that with a cold, if you see a £10 note on the floor you will go and pick it up and with flu, you won’t. Why is a criteria like this necessary? Why can’t we just say: "if the pain is level 5 then it is flu, if it is 4 it is a cold"?

Even with our own sensations we need some independent criteria to decide what to call them. So it can’t be that when we say that someone else is in pain, the meaning comes from their sensation as we don’t have any way of evaluating that sensation apart from other criteria.

Philosophical Investigations, Part 1, 258-293

Rule following

If we don’t rely on reference or on our own internal experiences, we can consider if there are rules that we can follow that can describe correct and incorrect use of language.

A footballer falls to the ground, writhing. Another player, protesting his innocence, is given a red card. The writhing player immediately recovers in time to take the winning penalty. Are the spectators justified in saying "he was pretending to be in pain"?

Perhaps there is a lion language equivalent. A lion could growl about a wildebeest "playing dead". Maybe in the case that a wildebeest lies still after being attacked but then suddenly recovers, the lion would call this "playing dead". This could be a rule. "Playing dead" is defined objectively as "wildebeest that are still after being attacked and then run away". If we can learn the rules that define the lion language like this then we can understand it.

But then imagine, one day, some lion cubs are learning the lion language. They play with each other and one gets stunned, then comes round and one of the other cubs mistakenly says he was "playing dead". Maybe this is something the lions like, maybe they find it funny. They continue to use this "joke". Now the rule has changed. Or is it somehow the same rule which included the new behaviour? For "playing dead" to have a meaning, the lion clubs need to be told when they are using it wrong but it also seems that new cases can be created that are acceptable given the right circumstances. So it seems like "rules" are not fundamental to meaning in lion-language.

How easy would it be for us to understand this joke if we didn’t hunt wildebeest or never played at it with other lion cubs? Is it necessary to teach lion cubs how to hunt to appreciate the humour?

Philosophical Investigations, Part 1, 143-155

Meaning as use

If meaning is not defined by rules, or by what pictures we have in our minds nor by feelings and sensations then how can we learn language? Wittgenstein’s answer is that the meaning of the word is the use of that word within the language. Not one particular use but all of the uses that are possible. "The meaning" becomes vague here though. In the case of "playing dead" some lions may never have heard of the lion cub joke. Or maybe they have a different humour. In this case, maybe for them "playing dead" is wrong usage in a lion cub game.

How can the meaning of words be vague like this when we use them every day and rely on them? In this case the lion cub game usage might be considered to be a kind of usage at the edge of the meaning of "playing dead" whereas the application of this particular growl to wildebeest would be more central and more widely acceptable to the community. It’s more important to be correct about the wildebeest example because it can mean the difference between going hungry or eating a nice wildebeest. Maybe some serious lions disapprove of the joke version as not taking hunting seriously enough!

Philosophical Investigations, Part 1, 120

Language games

So now the meaning of "playing dead" and the implications of using it, say within your own family group or where other lions from more serious family groups are present is getting more complicated. Maybe some older lions would see this as a provocation, maybe a young lion might begin to use this growl as a form of rebellion towards these older lions. But all of these usages depend very much on what is at stake for the lions and their experience of hunting wildebeest.

This intimate interdependence of meaning with practice and behaviour within a social setting, is what Wittgenstein calls a "language-game". These are activities within which we use, create and learn a language. It’s not possible to understand the offensiveness of using the lion cub "playing dead" growl without growing up in a lion community, hunting with other lions, having differences between one family group and another. The "meaning" could not be separated from all these activities.

Philosophical Investigations, Part 1, 23-27

Family resemblances

Wittgenstein sees all language use as part of a language game. Language games can have many varied uses for the same word. Often those uses will be related but not by a single definition, rule, reference, thought or sensation. Instead the uses of the word resemble each other in ways that are similar to how members of a family resemble each other.

In a family, the members resemble each other in various ways but there need be no single common feature amongst them all. My sister might have similar eyebrows to me and my mother but she has my fathers mouth. My uncle might have similar blue eyes but different hair. Nevertheless altogether, the family can be distinguished from others by these varied features. But equally there are no definitive features of families either.

In lion-speak there might be a word similar to "stalk" that might mean approaching a wildebeest but it might also be used to mean a lion cub game. A further case could be when a male lion approaches a female lion in heat. Or when a lion cub approaches his mother. Even though there is different behaviour in each of these cases, there are some similarities in each as well. In determining whether these uses make sense in the lion language, much will depend on the particular details of each of these activities and their similarities.

Philosophical Investigations, Part 1, 66-67

Forms of life

As a whole, all the activities and language-games of a being such as a talking lion or a human, combine together in what can be called a "form of life". This consists of many different language-games, many of which are related, like the relationship between lion cub hunting and real hunting or the relationship between science and sport amongst humans. There are overlaps but also these language-games are quite different. Nevertheless they all form a part of an integrated human or lion life. Meaning is not contained separately in any language-game but is distributed across the whole range since there is potentially interplay between them all at any point in spite of the ways we tend to maintain separation.

Philosophical Investigations, Part 2, i

Conclusion

So the question of whether we can "understand" a lion if it could talk will depend very much on the extent to which we could participate in the lion's "form of life". Could we become part of that community? It seems to me that the degree to which this will be possible would depend on the amount of overlap there would be between lion and human language games and form of life. While this would not be great, I think it would not be nothing either. I think that we could understand a lion language a little but probably we could not fully understand him.

Post-script

I said before the discussion of the lion language that Wittgenstein’s thought, as well as eliminating meaningless problems such as "Is there a nuomemnon?" also makes some discussions more practical. As an example I offer this discussion of "meritocracy"

By my lights a weakness with this essay is the search for a final and complete definition of "meritocracy". Taking Wittgenstein's approach, it becomes easier to see that the meaning of "meritocracy" is not one thing and is intimately linked with the circumstances.

When the founding fathers of the United States talked of "meritocracy" it was in contrast to "aristocracy" because many positions were inherited and assigned according to rank at the time. A part of Napoleon's radicalism lay in selecting his commanders according to their ability rather than by birth. In this context meritocracy was well-defined by the opposition to this practice.

Now, when there is no aristocracy defined by birth, the use and the meaning is going to have to change. Asking "What is Meritocracy?" is less helpful than asking "how do we want to use the word merit, to move towards the society that we want?"